Glossary
Malformed Input
NUL-IN-URL

NUL-IN-URL

Test IDMAL-NUL-IN-URL
CategoryMalformed Input
Expected400 or close

What it sends

A request with a NUL byte (\x00) embedded in the URL.

GET /\x00test HTTP/1.1\r\n
Host: localhost:8080\r\n
\r\n

The URL contains a NUL byte (\x00) between / and test.

What the RFC says

The request-target in an HTTP/1.1 request must conform to the URI grammar from RFC 3986. The pchar rule defines valid path characters:

pchar = unreserved / pct-encoded / sub-delims / ":" / "@" — RFC 3986 Section 3.3

unreserved = ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "." / "_" / "~" — RFC 3986 Section 2.3

A raw NUL byte (0x00) is not included in any of these productions, making it an invalid character in a URI path.

“When a server listening only for HTTP request messages…receives a sequence of octets that does not match the HTTP-message grammar…the server SHOULD respond with a 400 (Bad Request) response and close the connection.” — RFC 9112 Section 2.2

Why it matters

NUL bytes terminate strings in C/C++. A NUL in the URL could cause path truncation in backend systems, allowing path traversal or access to unintended resources.

Deep Analysis

Relevant ABNF 

request-line   = method SP request-target SP HTTP-version
origin-form    = absolute-path [ "?" query ]
absolute-path  = 1*( "/" segment )
segment        = *pchar
pchar          = unreserved / pct-encoded / sub-delims / ":" / "@"
unreserved     = ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "." / "_" / "~"
pct-encoded    = "%" HEXDIG HEXDIG
sub-delims     = "!" / "$" / "&" / "'" / "(" / ")"
               / "*" / "+" / "," / ";" / "="

RFC Evidence

“A URI is composed from a limited set of characters consisting of digits, letters, and a few graphic symbols.” – RFC 3986 Section 2

pchar = unreserved / pct-encoded / sub-delims / ":" / "@" – RFC 3986 Section 3.3

“When a server listening only for HTTP request messages…receives a sequence of octets that does not match the HTTP-message grammar aside from the robustness exceptions listed above, the server SHOULD respond with a 400 (Bad Request) response and close the connection.” – RFC 9112 Section 2.2

Chain of Reasoning

  1. NUL (0x00) matches no URI production. Walking through every alternative in pchar: unreserved covers only ALPHA (%x41-5A, %x61-7A), DIGIT (%x30-39), and four specific symbols; pct-encoded requires a leading %; sub-delims lists specific ASCII punctuation; : is %x3A; @ is %x40. The byte 0x00 is below the lowest value in any of these sets.

  2. NUL is not even a valid request-line octet. The request-line grammar requires method SP request-target SP HTTP-version. The SP character is %x20. The method is a token (requires tchar, minimum %x21). There is no production in the HTTP/1.1 grammar that accommodates %x00 anywhere in the request-line.

  3. The grammar violation triggers the rejection rule. Since the request-target contains an octet that does not match the URI grammar, the entire request-line fails to match HTTP-message. RFC 9112 Section 2.2 instructs the server to respond with 400 and close.

  4. C-string truncation is the primary exploit vector. In C and C++, strings are NUL-terminated. A NUL byte at position 1 in /\x00test would cause strlen() to return 1, making the path appear as just /. This can bypass path-based access controls, allow directory listing where only specific files should be served, or truncate filenames to access unintended resources.

  5. No robustness exception applies. The only robustness exception in RFC 9112 Section 2.2 is ignoring empty CRLF lines before the request-line. NUL bytes receive no such exception.

Sources

MANY-HEADERSCONTROL-CHARS-HEADER